It is well known that in the standard deterministic two-sector economy the imposition of a tariff induces a resource flow from the export industry to the import competing industry if the external terms of trade do not change. This is the small-country case. It is also known that in the large-country case, that is, in the case in which a country's import (export) volume influences its external terms of trade, an imposition of a tariff may induce a resource flow out of the import competing industry and into the export industry. This is known as the Metzler Paradox (see Metzler 1949 ). In the smallcountry case, the imposition of the tariff necessarily reduces the internal terms of trade because the external terms of trade do not change. Since domestic competitive-resource allocation is governed by the internal terms of trade, the deterioration in the internal terms of trade which follows the tariff leads to an expansion of the import competing industry and to a contraction of the export industry. Hence, the tariff is protective in this case. In the large-country case, the imposition of a tariff may increase the external terms of trade at a rate which exceeds the rate of tariff, in which Partial support from the Ford Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. It is the purpose of this paper to show that in the presence of uncertainty a tariff need not provide protection to the import competing industry even in the small-country case. The situation in which this may occur is one in which there is international trade in commodities but no international trade in securities. If there is international trade in securities, a tariff does provide conventional protection.
Our analysis relies on the model developed in Helpman and Razin (1978a, 1978b ). In this model there is a stock market in which shares of firms are traded. The allocation of the factors of production is governed by equity prices and depends on commodity prices only to the extent that they influence equity prices. In the absence of international trade in securities, domestic equity prices are internally determined, since domestic risks are then fully borne by domestic residents. Now, the imposition of a tariff in a small country worsens necessarily the internal commodity terms of trade in every state of nature. However, its impact on relative equity prices, which determines the interindustry resource flow, depends on whether the tariff will shift the demand for equities toward the import competing sector or away from it. If tariff proceeds are not redistributed back to consumers, then the shift in the demand for equities is ambiguous. We provide an example in which demand shifts toward the equities of the exportable industry; in this case, the tariff does not protect the import competing industry. We also show that when tariff proceeds are redistributed back to consumers in the form of lump-sum transfers, a "small" tariff protects the import competing industry if both goods are normal in consumption. (The difference between the two cases-with and without tariff proceeds redistribution-is explained at the end of the example.) This contrasts with the deterministic small-country case in which the redistribution policy is not important for the protective effect of a tariff (it is important though for the large-country case).
I. The Model
Our small economy consists of firms and consumers who operate in an uncertain environment generated by random production technology or random world prices. These random elements produce an incentive to develop financial capital markets, whose existence-in the form of stock markets-we assume. Input decisions have to be made before the resolution of uncertainty. As a result, firms face random profits and cannot undertake profit maximization. Instead, we assume-following Diamond (1967)-that firms choose their input levels so as to maximize their net value on the stock market; this procedure is equivalent to profit maximization whenever the relevant random elements become degenerate (i.e., their value becomes known with certainty). After the resolution of uncertainty, returns are realized and distributed to the firm's final stockholders.
Individuals play a double role in this economy. In the first stage-before the resolution of uncertainty individuals choose a portfolio by means of trading in the stock market. An equity in a firm entitles the stockholder to a share in the firm's random return. This share equals the inverse of the number of the firm's outstanding equities. This is the stage in which individuals play the role of investors.
In the second stage-after the resolution of uncertainty-individuals use the proceeds from portfolios to purchase commodities. This is the stage in which they play the role of consumers.
Clearly, the two roles are interrelated. The ultimate goal of a portfolio chosen in the first stage is to provide consumption in the second stage. Hence, portfolio choice depends on preferences over consumption goods, but it also depends on probability beliefs, price expectations, and attitudes toward risk. 1978a, 1978b ) that, given the relative price of type 2 real equities q0 (q0 is the price of type 2 real equities divided by the price of type 1 real equities), net-value-maximizing firms choose in an equilibrium a point on the transformation curve TT at which the MRT (marginal rate of transformation) between Z2 and Z, is equal to q0. Hence, given q0, production of real equities takes place at point P0 in figure 1. Corresponding to point P0, there is an equilibrium wage rate and rental rate on capital and an equilibrium allocation of the fixed supplies of labor and capital between the sectors. Given PF, the output of commodities is not uniquely determined; it depends on the state of nature. If state a realizes, the output of commodity i will be Oj(c.)4, i = 1, 2.
By varying q along TT, we trace out the general equilibrium supply functions: 
subject to zi + q'z2 < Z1 (q0) + qZ2 (q), where zi is the purchase of type i real equities and E is the expectations operator based on subjective probability beliefs. Commodity prices, which may be state dependent, p(a), are assumed to be given to our small country. It is assumed in equation (4) that individuals know the price ratio p(a) in every state (i.e., their price expectations are correct) but that they do not know which state will realize. Assuming risk aversion, we can draw a set of assets-indifference curves convex to the origin, where an assets-indifference curve is defined as all combinations of (z1, Z2) for which the expected utility is constant. Then, the solution to equation (4) can be represented by the tangency of an assets-indifference curve to an assets-budget line, like point E' in figure 1. The curve U0U0 represents here the highest affordable expected utility level. Observe that points P0 and E' in figure 1 represent an equilibrium in which there is international trade in equities and in which the rest of the world produces a perfect substitute for domestic type 2 real equities, which are imported. If there is no international trade in equities, the equilibrium domestic relative price q will be such as to make zi = Zi(q), i = 1, 2. Such an equilibrium is represented in figure 2 by point P at which an assetsindifference curve is tangent to the transformation curve. Notice, however, that we are still assuming international trade in commodities after the realization of a state of nature at the prevailing world prices p(a).
At this point, the reader should note that the assets-indifference curves depend on the distribution of relative commodity prices. A shift in the price distribution pivots the entire assets-indifference map.
II. Protection under Uncertainty
Consider an ad valorem tariff on the second commodity, assuming that the second commodity is imported in every state of nature. The effect of the tariffon the allocation of resources between the two sectors differs according to whether international trade in securities takes place. We begin with the case of no international trade in securities, in which domestic residents bear all domestic risks. 
A. No International Trade in Securities
The tariff-inclusive assets-indifference curves (which, along with the production possibilities curve, help determine the economy's production) are given by
Ev[(l + t)p(c); 01(a)zI + (1 + t)P(0)02(a)Z2 (5) + T (a, t)] = constant, where t = the tariff rate (assumed to be state independent) and T(a, t) = state a expected lump-sum transfer payments. If tariff proceeds are redistributed back to consumers, T(x, t) is assumed to equal tariff proceeds in state a. The consumer treats T(a, t) as a state-dependent lump-sum transfer; he does not relate it to the volume of imports, just like in the deterministic model. If tariff proceeds are not redistributed, T(a, t) equals zero
in every state of nature. This is the relevant case if, for example, the government uses tariff proceeds in order to purchase commodities. (If the government's spending is related to the provision of public goods, our analysis is unaltered if we assume that the direct utility function is additively separable in private and public goods.) In the small-country deterministic case, a tariff protects the import competing industry independently of the way in which the tariff revenue is disposed of. In the present framework this is not so, which makes our distinction between the two extreme cases of the use of tariff revenue relevant. The tariff-inclusive marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between real equity 2 and real equity 1 is given by
MRS(z1, z2; t) E(1 + t)p(00)02(cL)v[(l + t)p(a) ;01(a)z1 + (1 + t)P(x)02(a)Z2 + T(a,t ] E01(ci)v1[(l + t)P(0);O01(a)zI + (1 + t)p(a)02(0)z2 + T(a,,t)]
Let us start with a discussion of the case in which tariff proceeds are not distributed back to consumers. In this case, individuals choose a portfolio expecting (correctly) no transfers after the realization of a state of nature.
T(oc, t) = 0 for all t and at = 1, 2, . . . , S.
From equations (6) and (7) it is readily verified that a change in the tariff rate twists the assets-indifference curves at every point (zl, z 2) and changes the MRS between real equities 2 and 1. This is because the tariff changes the mean as well as higher moments (such as the variance) of the distribution of the relative internal price of good 2. In figure 3, point g denotes the pretariff stock market equilibrium in which the pretariff assets-indifference curve U0U0 is tangent to the production possibilities curve TT. If the posttariff assets-indifference curve, which passes through the initial point El', is steeper than U0 U0, as U1 U1, the new equilibrium must be at a point on TT to the right of E:; that is, resources I I38 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY will move away from sector 1 and into the import competing sector, sector 2-the standard case. If the posttariff assets-indifference curve which passes through E: is flatter than U0U0, as U2U2, the new equilibrium will be at a point on TT to the left of E:; that is, resources will move away from the importable goods sector and into the exportable goods sector. In the second case, a tariff does not protect the import competing sector, contrary to the deterministic case.
In order to see the factors which influence the "twist" in the assetsindifference curves, we derive the expression for the derivative of the assets' marginal rate of substitution evaluated at a zero tariff rate. Differentiating the right-hand side of equation (6), using equation (7) That is, a zero tariff rate gives rise to a zero amount of tariff proceeds, and the rate of change in the tariff proceeds for a small tariff is equal to imports evaluated at world prices. Individuals choose a portfolio expecting to receive a lump-sum transfer of T(ci, t) in state a, a = 1, 2, . . . , S (they are not aware of the relationship given in eq.
[9]). Now we show that if both goods are normal the paradoxical result cannot appear in the case of a small tariff. In order to see this, differentiate equation (6) with respect to t and evaluate it at t = 0, using equation ( If both goods are normal, the marginal propensities to spend on them are positive and the above expression is positive. This means that for normal goods a small tariff will twist the assets-indifference curves in figure 3 so as to make them steeper, like from U0U0 to U1 U1 and thus provide protection to the importable goods sector.
Finally, observe that an equity subsidy-i.e., a subsidy given to an industry at the financing stage -will unambiguously induce the expansion of that industry. In figure 4 we reconstruct the initial equilibrium shown in figure  3 , the real equity-price ratio being q. A subsidy to sales of real equity 2 decreases to q' the relative price of real equity 2 to investors and drives a PROTECTIVE EFFECT OF A TARIFF I 14I wedge between that relative price and the marginal rate of transformation q"f, leading to a new equilibrium Es. In this case, resources will move away from sector 1 and into sector 2.
B. International Trade in Securities
Now consider the case in which the economy trades with the outside world in both commodities and securities. By the small-country assumption, without a tariff, commodity prices and security prices are given to the home country. A tariff raises the local price of the importable goods, but how does a tariff affect the importable-good industry's stock market value? It is explained in Helpman and Razin (1978b) that a tariff at a rate of lOOt percent, which increases the price of the second commodity by lOOt percent in every state of nature, increases by l OOt percent the return on each unit of domestic type 2 real equities. This will result in a lOOt percent increase in the price of local type 2 real equities in order to eliminate profitable arbitrage. The local type 2 real equity provides a return of (1 + t) 02 (a)P(a) in state a while the foreign type 2 real equity provides a return of 02 (a) p(a) in state a. Hence, one unit of a local type 2 real equity is now equivalent to (1 + t) units of foreign type 2 real equities. This means that the price of local type 2 real equities increases from q to (1 + t) q. Thus, following a tariff, resources will move necessarily away from the exportable-good industry and into the importable-good industry, as in the deterministic case.
